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One of the primary training tools available to a Unified Commander-in-Chief (CINC) for
training his staff on their joint mission essential tasks (JMETLs) is a command post exercise
supported by a computer simulation model, commonly referred to as a Computer Aided Exercise
(CAX). Currently, little quantitative data are captured during the exercise allowing for quick post-
exercise analysis of critical staff processes inherent in the CINCs exercise training objectives.
The objective of this thesis is to develop an exercise analysis methodology for evaluating the
execution ofjoint tasks during the conduct of a CAX. Specific objectives are first to demonstrate a
methodology for developing quantifiable measures of effectiveness (MOEs). These MOEs must
reflect the hierarchical structure of tasks given in the Universal Jomt Tasks List (UJTL) as applied
to three levels of war (vertical linkage), and functionality considerations between related enabling
tasks (horizontal linkage). The second specific objective is to determine methods to capture task
performance data within the design of the simulation This is intended to support the exercise
analysis by capturing critical decisions, assumptions, and causal factors which, in turn, lead to
observed scenario outcomes. This objective involves demonstrating the methodology in an exercise
conducted utilizing the Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS). The effort in this thesis is focused
exclusively on joint tasks involving force protection, particularly air defense, of a battlegroup in the
littoral region, however, the principles of the methodology are applicable to the entire spectrum of





B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 2
C. NAVAL APPLICATION 3
D THESIS STRUCTURE 5
II. JOINT TRAINING PROCESS 7
A DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNIVERSAL JOINT TASK LIST (UJTL) 8
B JOINT TRAINING PROGRAM 10
C JOINT THEATER LEVEL SIMULATION (JTLS) 1
1
ID. JOINT THEATER AAW OPERATIONS 15
A JOINT AIR OPERATIONS 15
B. THEATER AIR DEFENSE 21
C. LITTORAL AAW 23
D NAVAL FORCE PROTECTION 25
IV. MOE DEVELOPMENT 27
A JOINT TASKS SCHEMATIC 28
B. FUNCTIONAL TEMPLATES 30
C DATA REQUIREMENTS (DENDRITIC) 30
D MOP AND MOE DEVELOPMENT 33
1. AAW Kill Performance 35




4. CVBG AAW Strength 38
E. SUMMARY 38
vn
V. JTLS APPLICATION 41
A. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION 41
1. Heavy Scenario 44
2. Light Scenario 46
B. POSTPROCESSING 47
1. Sorting 47
2. Time Correlated Strength Measure 48
C. CONCLUSIONS 55
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 57
A. CONCLUSIONS 57
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 59
APPENDIX A. AAW STRENGTH FACTORS FOR CVBG ASSETS 61
APPENDIX B. STRENGTH FILE POST PROCESSOR OUTPUT 63
APPENDIX C. ENGAGEMENT FILE POST-PROCESSOR OUTPUT 67
APPENDIX D. AIR MISSION DETECTION FILE OUTPUT 69
APPENDIX E. AIR MISSION FILE 71
LIST OF REFERENCES 73
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 75
Vlll
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 Universal Joint Task List 9
Figure 2 A Combatant Commander's AOR/Theater [Ref 18] 17
Figure 3. Navy Airborne Tactical System Joint Connectivities [Ref 19] 18
Figure 4. Navy Tactical Data Systems Joint Connectivities. [Ref 19] 19
Figure 5 . Joint Tasks Schematic 29
Figure 6 Functional Template of Protection Tasks 31
Figure 7. Partial Dendritic For Force Protection 32
Figure 8 Data Requirements Flow Chart For Detect-To-Engage Sequence 34
Figure 9 CVBG Stationing Assignments in the Threat Sector 42
Figure 10 Overview of Southwest Asian Theater Scenario 44
Figure 1 1. Heavy Run Scenario Action 45
Figure 12. Time-Correlated AAW Strength Measure 48
Figure 13 CVBG Enemy Aircraft Engagement Data For Light Scenario 50
Figure 14 CVBG Enemy Aircraft Engagement Data For Saturation Scenario 51
Figure 15. CVBG Identification Performance in Saturation Scenario 52
Figure 16. CVBG Identification Performance in Light Scenario 53




AADC Area Air Defense Coordinator
AAR After Action Review
AAW Anti-Air Warfare
ASCM Anti-Ship Cruise Missile
CAP Combat Air Patrol
CAX Computer Aided Exercise
CG Guided Missile Cruiser
CINC Commander-in-Chief
CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CVBG Carrier Battlegroup
CVN Aircraft Carrier, Nuclear
DCA Defensive Counter Air
DLI Deck Launched Interceptor
DRC Dynamics Research Corporation
EMCON Emission Control
ESM Electronic Support Measures
HNS Host Nation Support
HVU High Value Unit
JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFC Joint Force Commander


















Joint Theater Level Simulation




Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations




Universal Joint Task List




One of the primary training tools available to a Unified Commander-in-Chief
(CINC) for training his staff on their joint mission essential tasks is a command post
exercise supported by a computer simulation model, commonly referred to as a Computer
Aided Exercise (CAX). The primary role of the computer simulation is to present a
decision environment within which the staff can be presented with
realistic, stochastic results. Currently, little quantitative data are captured during the
exercise allowing for quick post-exercise analysis of staff performance in tasks specified
in the CINC's exercise training objectives. Objective, data-supported assessment of staff
performance in joint mission essential tasks is important for two reasons. First, it helps to
determine whether training resources are being used efficiently, and if the training program
is achieving the desired results. Second, it helps to determine which mission essential
tasks are in need of additional training
The overall objective of this thesis is to develop an exercise analysis methodology
for objectively and efficiently evaluating CINC staff performance in the execution ofjoint
tasks during the conduct of a CAX. Specifically, this thesis focuses upon the
performance ofjoint tasks related to the anti-air warfare (AAW) capability of a carrier
battlegroup in a littoral scenario. Rather than subscribe to the current method of
post-CAX analysis based upon subjective observations, this methodology presents an
opportunity to quantify performance rapidly upon completion of the simulation To
accomplish this objective, four specific sub-objectives were achieved First, the analytical
tools necessary to evaluate the anti-air warfare (AAW) capability of a carrier battlegroup
Xlll
located in the littoral region as modeled in an unspecified CAX were developed Second,
appropriate measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs)
necessary to quantify staff performance were determined Third, requirements and
specifications for standardized ASCII files for capturing parameters necessary to
demonstrate post-exercise analysis were developed and, finally, the methodology was
tested using the Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS). While effort in this thesis is
focused exclusively on joint tasks involving force protection (particularly air defense of a
battlegroup in the littoral region), the principles of this methodology are applicable to the
entire spectrum of tasks in the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL).
Fundamental to this methodology is the assumption that execution of any given
task at a specified level of war is related to the execution of similar tasks at other levels of
war For instance, the UJTL strategic joint task "Provide Theater Protection" (ST 6) is
related to the respective operational and tactical tasks "Provide Operational Protection"
(OP 6) and "Employ Firepower" (TA 3) in the sense that the employment of firepower
may be required operationally to provide Force Protection. In short, to successfully
provide "Force Protection," joint forces must, at a minimum, demonstrate proficiency on
the operational level in "Operational Protection" and, on the tactical level, in the
employment of firepower. This establishes the idea of vertical and horizontal linkages
existing among tasks. Overall force protection is dependent upon many factors, but most
notably how well the functions of intelligence, arming, fueling, employing firepower,
manning, etc. are executed. After the functional and dependent relationships between
XIV
tasks are established, it is possible to determine a causal audit trail of actions leading to the
success or failure of the staffs force protection policy.
Because it is not desired to create JTLS-expert staffs, the intent is to adapt the
capabilities of the SIMSCRIPT-supported JTLS to the needs of the staff, rather than to
adapt the normal activities of the staff to the requirements of JTLS The methodology
demonstrated in this thesis is designed to expedite the implementation and evaluation of
staff plans and orders, while still facilitating the capture and processing of necessary data
from the theater level discrete-time simulation Once captured, the data are manipulated
to produce easily understandable graphical representations of the measures collected. For
example, if the force is unable to successfully defend against the enemy air threat, was this
poor defense the result of poor radar performance or an inability to shoot down the threat
once detected and engaged As such, the methodology produces a quantifiable review of




To lead an untrained people into war is to throw them away Confucius: Analacts, xiii, c. 500
B.C. [Ref 1]
A. BACKGROUND
The Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Memorandum of Policy 26 (MOP 26)
establishes a program for carrying out the joint training responsibilities of the CJCS, the
Unified Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs), and the CINC's component staffs Through
MOP 26, CJCS institutes a method for identifying joint training requirements through the
review of the CINC's missions and the compilation of the Joint Mission Essential Task
List (JMETL) A CINC's JMETL is intended to provide the basis for all joint training for
elements of his theater, whether in the strategic, operational or tactical level.
The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL, MCM 147-93), a supplement to the Joint
Training Manual (MCM 71-92), is an attempt at a comprehensive listing of all joint tasks
pertaining to the Armed Forces of the United States Though it will not be implemented
until 1998, the UJTL is intended to provide for all services a common language for
describing joint warfighting capabilities throughout the entire range of military operations,
including operations other than war. Specifically, tasks in the UJTL are defined as they
relate to the strategic (both national and theater), operational, and tactical levels of war.
Each joint task at the strategic level is broken down into supporting tasks, which may in
turn be further refined into enabling tasks.
One of the primary training tools available to a CINC for training his staff on their
joint mission essential tasks is a command post exercise supported by a computer
simulation model. This simulation is commonly referred to as a Computer Aided Exercise
(CAX). The primary role of the computer simulation is to present a decision environment
within which the CINC and his staff may be presented with realistic, stochastic results.
Based upon the events represented in this simulated environment, joint staffs implement
plans, monitor the current situation, and further develop or alter plans as necessitated by
changing requirements in the scenario.
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The overall objective of this thesis is to develop an exercise analysis methodology
for objectively and efficiently evaluating CINC staff performance in the execution ofjoint
tasks during the conduct of a CAX. Rather than subscribe to the current method of post-
CAX analysis based upon subjective observations, this methodology presents an
opportunity to quantify performance rapidly upon completion of the simulation.
Specifically, this methodology focuses on Strategic Task Six, Provide Theater Protection,
as stated in the Universal Joint Task List. To accomplish this objective, four specific sub-
objectives must be achieved:
1 Develop the analytical tools necessary to evaluate the anti-air warfare (AAW)
capability of a carrier battlegroup located in the littoral region as modeled in an
unspecified CAX.
2. Determine appropriate measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of
effectiveness (MOEs).
3. Test the methodology using the Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS).
4. Develop requirements and specifications for standardized ASCII files for
capturing parameters necessary to demonstrate a potential post-exercise
analysis.
This research parallels similar efforts by Capt. Kerry Gordon, USMC, on Universal
Joint Tasks involving firepower [Ref 2]; LT Mark Sullivan, USN, involving mobilization
planning, [Ref 3] CPT Kevin Brown, USA, on tasks involving maneuver warfare;
[Ref 4] CPT John Thurman, USA, on tasks involving theater force protection, [Ref 5]
and Maj Mark Cwick, USMC, on tasks involving amphibious operations [Ref 6]
Furthermore, the research builds upon that performed last year by CPT Ray Combs, USA,
[Ref 7] and LT Chris Towery, USN [Ref 8] It is recommended that these additional
theses be read in conjunction with this document. Taken together, these theses represent
the baseline for future efforts to develop evaluation methodology for joint staff
performance.
C. NAVAL APPLICATION
Ships, planes, tanks, and most importantly, trained soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines, and the
leadership to make the force work in joint and combined operations cannot be created in a few
days or months. General Colin L. Powell [Ref 9]
The United States military's contribution to diplomacy is often carried out through
power projection. Successful power projection requires that naval forces locate and
operate in regions other than strictly blue water, open ocean zones. As a result, strategic
requirements often dictate that naval High Value Units (HVUs), such as aircraft carriers
(CVNs) and guided missile cruisers (CGs), station themselves well within the effective
weapons range of enemy land based forces. For naval assets, force protection while
stationed in a littoral region is a difficult proposition for several reasons
First, while naval surface forces are positioned in a "near land/overland"
environment (the region where naval sensors extend from sea to an area "overland"),
individual surface platforms' organic active sensors experience a unique phenomenon
which degrades their performance as a result of mixed returns from sea and land
backgrounds. In short, because naval air and surface radars are designed to operate
predominantly over maritime environments, their performance is degraded when placed in
proximity to the shoreline. Accordingly, individual asset positioning and specific sensor
employment while stationed in the littoral can significantly influence the overall sensor
performance of the battlegroup.
Second, with the decreased flight range associated with littoral targets and
technological advances - particularly in weapons speed and flight profile - comes
decreased reaction time. To ensure success against the variety and complexity of weapon
systems constituting the enemy air threat (aircraft and missiles), the joint force requires
thorough preparation prior to the initiation of actual conflict. Offensive action by enemy
aerospace assets must be countered by a strategy based upon unity of effort by all forces,
employing all joint air defense assets in a manner which minimizes overall reaction time
and maximizes the collective defensive capability of the force.
In sum, the basically reactive nature of air warfare to the enemy's choice of
strategy dictates that consistently successful air defense cannot be adequately improvised
in extremis. Effective prior training at all levels of war, and constant surveillance of both
the enemy's assets and the joint force's air superiority region must be maintained to ensure
the timely response of air defense.
D. THESIS STRUCTURE
The next chapter outlines the joint training process employed by the military
services as directed and agreed upon by the CJCS Chapter III describes the current joint
AAW hierarchy and explains the issues of interest and primary concerns to joint task force
commanders (JFCs) Also in Chapter III, the difficulties of naval AAW in the littoral are
examined, and issues relating to naval force protection in the littoral are outlined. Chapter
IV details a methodology for developing quantifiable measures of effectiveness necessary
for the evaluation of carrier battlegroup (CVBG) AAW in the CAX and the relationships
between strategic, operational and tactical tasks associated with Force Protection. This
particular methodology focuses on describing relationships existing between tasks in terms
of the critical issues underlying their accomplishment. For example, where naval warfare
is defined more appropriately by power warfare more than maneuver warfare, the critical
issues defining accomplishment are based upon enemy kills, not necessarily movement or
logistics, though they certainly contribute. [Ref 10] Chapter V demonstrates a
methodology for extracting data from a Joint Theater Level Simulation which can be used
in a post-exercise analysis/after action review (AAR). Chapter VI discusses conclusions
and provides recommendations for further refinements and study.

II. JOINT TRAINING PROCESS
Maintaining high readiness of our forces is a prerequisite to deterring aggression and responding
to crises Today we are placing increased emphasis on joint readiness strengthening joint doctrine
and education, developing joint readiness measures, and improving joint and coalition training
[Refll: p. hi]
United States military operations range over a wide spectrum of conflict, with
operations other than war (OOTW) recently added to the more traditional combat roles
Accordingly, and as a result of the country's unique position as the dominant world
power, the United States military must remain strong and capable at all times. However, in
a military era characterized predominantly by budget cuts and force reductions, large scale
joint training availabilities are, at best, infrequent As a result, the overall quality of
military training must increase to fill the experience gap created by reduced opportunities
for "hands-on" training. Combined military forces are developing and implementing new
joint doctrine with an emphasis on symbiotically harnessing the strengths of the services,
while effectively reducing weaknesses. Therefore a premium is placed on the efficient
implementation of strategy without a compromise in effectiveness.
This new effort will provide true joint functionality over air, land, sea, space, and
special operations environments, using tactical C4I nets for distributed training, and will
be based on joint doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures. As a direct result of the
force multiplier effect experienced through joint operations, multi-service coordination is
now the standard by which all tactical and operational success will be measured
However, decreasing defense budgets drive the reality that future joint training
requirements will be met increasingly by modeling and simulations. With that in mind, the
critical issue for CINCs becomes the method of maximizing training benefits in a new,
budget constrained environment.
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNIVERSAL JOINT TASK LIST
(UJTL)
As to the military side of the war, there is one lesson which stands out above all others. Tins is
that modem warfare can be effectively conducted only by the close and effective integration of the
three military arms, which make their primary contribution to the military power of the nation on
the ground, at sea, and from the air. Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, USh' [Ref 12]
The current version of the UJTL was developed by Dynamics Research
Corporation (DRC) under the direction of the Joint Exercise and Training Division of the
Joint Staffs J-7 Directorate. To create a thorough document, the Joint Staff, CINCs,
Services, and other concerned agencies coordinated the design input of over 120
organizations. [Ref 13] As written, the UJTL, which has the flavor of the U.S. Army
Blueprint of the Battlefield, provides a common structure for describing joint warfighting
capabilities in terms of tasks, conditions and standards for all services. With the UJTL,
each branch of the service is able to focus training on tasks described in a common
doctrinal language which have not only unique service applications, but real-time joint
applications as well. Furthermore, capabilities within the three levels of war depicted in
the UJTL describe the entire range of military operations, including operations other than
war (OOTW) and Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). [Ref 14]
One aspect ofDRC s overall project included the creation of the joint task list,
joint conditions list, and associated task measures. The joint task list, as displayed in
Figure 1, consists of all joint, supporting, and enabling tasks at each of the three levels of
war which formally specify the required capabilities of the nation's armed forces The
joint conditions list contains various physical, political, social, and military states that
describe all anticipated operational environments. Additionally, DRC developed computer
software to aid in the use of the UJTL. In the current Joint Training Computerized
Analysis (JoinT-CATS) software, which allows users to sort the joint, enabling and
supporting tasks according to topics of interest, DRC provides several measures
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Figure 1. Universal Joint Task List.
of effectiveness (MOEs). These MOEs are parameters describing task performance that,
when specified in terms of conditions and a minimum acceptable level of performance, are
a statement of the task's standard. The joint measures list provides performance criteria at

the task level to assist commanders in quantitatively assessing staff performance and
determining those tasks in greatest need of additional training [Ref 14]
B. JOINT TRAINING PROGRAM
It is believed that leaders and subordinates of all ranks, at all levels, do most of their learning
dunng training, thus making "realistic, demandmg, and objectively measured training and
exercises a must." [Ref 9 ]
The military's joint training program encompasses all aspects ofjoint training
within the DOD Fundamental to the program are the following two tenants:
1
.
Base training on mission requirements, emphasizing warfighting as the highest
training priority, and
2. Joint training must conform to, and exercise, joint doctrine. [Ref 13]
Military missions supporting the national military strategy are assigned to CINCs, after
which a mission analysis is conducted to determine required command-level capabilities
[Ref. 1 1] Essential capabilities are reflected in the CINCs Joint Mission Essential Task
List (JMETL) which identifies a specific CINCs priorities while providing the collective
requirements base for all joint training in his theater. Joint Mission Essential Tasks must
be referenced in terms of the UJTL. [Ref 14] Requirements for training are based on the
CINCs JMETL, along with applicable joint doctrine/joint tactics, techniques and
procedures (JTTP) Requirements are then analyzed in terms of appropriate mission
conditions, necessary standards, command level responsibility and training resources
available, in order to generate the CINCs Joint Training Plan and subsequent exercise
schedule [Ref 14] Developing a training program for scheduling an exercise without a
JMETL linkage, regardless of the scale of the proposed training, may result in the
10
unfocused and often wasteful expenditure of scarce resources and should therefore be
avoided.
The purpose of the joint training program is to establish the relationship between
the joint training system and the joint doctrine system — ultimately to provide an improved
fighting force for the CINC. The focus of the program is on clearly defining joint training
requirements in order to more efficiently allocate scarce training and operational resources
and to improve the ways and means of conducting joint training in the ultimate interest of
improving readiness. [Ref 14]
The selection and documentation of tasks, conditions and standards and the
concept of employment of forces are functions of the combatant commands, their
operational joint force commanders, and the functional joint force component
commanders. Theater commanders, who assess training, are encouraged to communicate
their training requirements to subordinate commanders through the JMETL process.
While the UJTL in its entirety is a document almost exclusively for the CINC, combatant
commanders may train independently or, with other forces, specifically to their CINC's
JMETL However, below the theater level, ultimate training responsibility remains with
the individual unit commanders.
C. JOINT THEATER LEVEL SIMULATION (JTLS)
...Train and exercise today's forces, on today's equipment, with today's doctrine... General
Shalikashvili, CJCS [Ref 12]
The Joint Theater Level Simulation is an interactive, multisided, joint (air, land,
sea and special operations) and combined (coalition warfare) constructive simulation
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model which is used for both operational planning and training support JTLS, a
computer-based wargaming system, strives to model conflict (combat operations, pre-
combat, and post-combat) at the operational level with tactical fidelity. JTLS supports
explicit coalition warfare functions: dynamic coalition development, designation of
political or military factions, setting of Rules of Engagement (ROE), executing Host-
Nation Support (HNS) agreements, conducting Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
(NEO) and operational conflict. A modularized software architecture allows distributed
operations across multiple hardware platforms, witnessed by the ability to run JTLS on
"open systems," including SUN, HP and DEC workstations The latest release of JTLS,
version 2 0, contains several significant improvements over the previous release (version
1
.0), including an integrated graphics user interface, a message processor, on-line player
manual, a combat events program and an information management terminal.
The program is separated into six operational modules: main, logistics, air, ground,
naval and intelligence Included in functional changes to the previous release are psyops,
in which the affected units suffer decreased effectiveness; civil affairs activity; improved
intelligence representation, including "real world" reports in MTF format; casualty and
remains processing, in which battle casualties and remains accumulate until evacuated; and
a shared air picture, in which coalition sides receive air tracks only if they have either no
track or an incorrect identification. The "windows-style" graphical user interface
provides a significant improvement over version 1.0, which was largely dependent upon
familiarity with the Model Interface Program (MIP) order input functions and a
voluminous user manual The data-driven version 2.0 features on-line hypertext user help
12





III. JOINT THEATER AAW OPERATIONS
To conquer the command of the air means victory, to be beaten in the air means defeat Giulio
Douhet The Command ofthe Air, 1921 [Ref 1]
A. JOINT AIR OPERATIONS
Due to the complexities of conducting joint air operations in support of varying
warfighting and OOTW missions, joint air operations must be exercised under conditions
that best replicate the operating environment in order to ensure success in times of
conflict. In the past, the implementation ofjoint air doctrine, particularly coordinating
large air operations from Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) afloat, who is
responsible to the Joint Force Commander for coordinating the air operations of the joint
force, had significant capability limitations. [Ref 15] As a result of these past difficulties,
joint commanders now carefully define the theater air conditions for optimum command
and control ofjoint air operations and exercise them as soon and often as feasible prior to
actual employment A coordinated and integrated air defense system under a single
commander is essential to successful area operations, whether at sea or over land. In
order to ensure consistent success, air defense forces must be organized, equipped, trained
and, when possible, positioned and alerted prior to hostilities. It is essential that
compatible Army, Navy/Marine, and Air Force electronic coordination and control means,
operationally connected, are established and exercised prior to the operation ofjoint air
defense forces within a theater of war. Coordination of effort and unity of action, to
include close coordination with sea-based and adjacent air defense commanders, is
imperative for successful air defense operations.
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Joint doctrine defines air defense as "all measures designed to nullify or reduce the
effectiveness of the attack by hostile aircraft or guided missiles after they are airborne"
and active air defense as "direct defensive action taken to destroy or reduce the
effectiveness of an enemy air attack " [Ref 16] Accordingly, air defense includes such
measures as the use of aircraft, antiaircraft artillery, electronic countermeasures, and
surface-to-air guided missiles in the accomplishment of the mission. Similarly, theater air
defense applies to the identification, integration, and employment of forces supported by
other theater and national capabilities to detect, identify, locate, track, minimize the effects
of and/or destroy enemy air assets within the theater [Ref 1 7]
Within a theater of operations, geographic features and time and distance factors
relative to the threat will affect the balance of effort required to successfully conduct
AAW operations The type of terrain in the vicinity of sensors will influence the
employment and siting ofAAW systems both on land and at sea. Climate and weather
may also be factors affecting the conduct of attack and defense operations. The
peculiarities of missile ranges, neutral country overflight restrictions, expected attack
direction, missile chemical or biological warhead dispersant, location of population
centers, location of units on the ground and ships at sea, communications systems and
connectivity requirements are all significant planning considerations for the most efficient
use ofAAW assets in a theater.
Figure 2 demonstrates the operational areas within a theater. [Ref 1 8] Within the
AOR in Figure 2, the CINC has designated a theater of war with two subordinate theaters
of operations. The CINC has also established a JOA within which a JTF will operate to
16
handle a situation outside the theater of war JOAs could also be established within the
theater of war or theater of operations. Despite the numerous locations for operating
forces within a CINC's theater, a major underlying premise of successful AAW is that
active defense operations should be centrally coordinated and decentrally executed
[Ref 17]
OPERATIONAL AREAS WITHIN A THEATER
Theaters of
Operations
Figure 2. A Combatant Commander's AOR/Theater. [Ref 18]
Two or more forces operating jointly in a theater must be provided the means of
conducting compatible information exchange. The ability to exchange information allows
each individual force to perform at a higher level of effectiveness than can be attained by
forces acting with no information exchange. Figure 3 displays the joint information
exchange link from the naval airborne perspective. [Ref 19] By ensuring the effective use
17
of information links between the services, a JFACC is able to ensure maximum efficiency,
effectiveness, responsiveness, appropriateness and simplicity, consistent with the tasks and
functions being accomplished [Ref 20] Furthermore, the radar footprint covered by the
combined naval, Air Force, Army and Marine air radar systems is far superior to any of the
services operating independently. Note that this particular joint connectivity is centered






































Figure 3. Navy Airborne Tactical System Joint Connectivities. [Ref 19]
At the joint level, the JFC may designate a joint force air component commander
(JFACC). The JFACC is responsible to the JFC for coordinating and integrating the air
operations of the joint force. Depending on the nature of the joint operations, a naval
commander may serve in a variety of roles. While the operation is primarily maritime, he
may serve as the JFC or as a JFACC and shift that command ashore if the operation shifts
landward in accordance with the JFC's concept of operations.
If the JFACC is a naval component commander, he will deploy on a surface vessel
best suited for the communications, information and weapons capability required of him
However, though he may initially be afloat, his joint tactical links are still capable of
encompassing ground, air and naval resources. Figure 4 displays a typical maritime





























Figure 4. Navy Tactical Data Systems Joint Connectivities. [Ref 19]
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The JFC normally assigns overall responsibility for theater/AOR air defense, to
include active defense, to the Area Air Defense Coordinator (AADC). The AADC assists
the JFC in determining missions, communications priorities, and Rules of Engagement
(ROE) for active defense forces, based on assessment and prioritization of forces, critical
assets and population centers Active defense forces are under the operational control of
their individual service component commanders who employ their forces under the
weapons control procedures and measures established by the AADC and approved by the
JFC The AADC is responsible to the JFC for coordinating and integrating the complete
air defense effort within the entire joint force The successful conduct of theater air
defense requires the integrated operation of all available air defense weapon systems of all
components in the theater Because this may require immediate action, authority to
integrate air defense forces and operations in overseas land areas will normally be
delegated in advance to the AADC. [Ref 1 7]
Specific responsibilities of the AADC include ensuring, through the organization
and application of appropriate procedures within the framework of other JFC air and
surface operations, that the optimum effectiveness is realized from each of the various
weapon systems used for active air defense. Additionally, the AADC will ensure that no
unnecessary restrictions are placed upon the employment of their weapons. If successfully
employed, the AADC will prevent duplication of effort and minimize the possibility of
fratricide through the coordination of the AAW assets of all service forces within the
theater.
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A combination of passive defense, active defense and attack operations, all fully
integrated and coordinated by a robust and efficient C4I architecture, is required to meet
the stringent performance requirements demanded ofjoint theater AAW. Such a mix must
provide for the survivability of combat forces, minimize the impact on friendly combat
operations, create uncertainty in enemy planning, and deter or deny the effective use of
aircraft and theater missiles by the enemy against a joint force
B. THEATER AIR DEFENSE
Cease firing, but if any enemy planes appear, shoot them down in a friendly fashion Fleet
Admiral William F. Halsey, 1945 [Ref 1]
The term "theater missile defense" applies to the identification, integration and
employment of forces supported by other theater and national capabilities to detect,
identify, locate, track, minimize the effects of and/or destroy enemy missiles or their
launchers. [Ref 17] Understanding this, Joint Theater Missile Defense (JTMD) systems
and procedures must be adaptable for joint or multinational operations in any contingency.
For example, in addition to standard warfighting situations, other operations such as
humanitarian assistance or noncombatant evacuation operations may be threatened by
hostile forces that have a theater or cruise missile capability. The term "theater missile" in
this context applies to ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and air-to-surface missiles whose
targets are within a given theater of operation
Potential adversaries possessing theater missiles (TMs) pose a threat to U.S.
security interests and forward deployed forces. The proliferation of TMs and advances in
missile and associated technologies, coupled with the pursuit of nuclear, biological and
21
chemical (NBC) capabilities, can provide our enemies with potentially decisive attack
capabilities, which may include the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), against
friendly targets. [Ref 1 7]
Attacking aircraft in the littoral region poses a difficult detection problem, as their
flight profile often takes them over terrain features at low altitude which hinder optimum
radar performance Accordingly, theater air defense can be difficult for a maritime
JFACC Similarly, cruise missiles can be air, land or sea-launched and normally fly to their
target at low altitude, thus creating a difficult acquisition problem. Often they follow an
unpredictable trajectory that makes it difficult to predict their exact impact point. The
mobility of cruise missile launch platforms, the small launch signature of the missiles and
their reduced radar cross section also complicate anti-cruise missile operations. Stealth
technologies have also been incorporated into cruise missiles, making them an even more
challenging target. A robust combination of friendly active defense and attack operations
is required to defeat the cruise missile threat. [Ref 17]
Because JTMD is inherently a joint mission, joint force components, supporting
CINCs, and multinational force TMD capabilities must be integrated toward the common
objective of neutralizing or destroying the enemy's TM capability. It has been proven that
effort expended in the active defense of cruise and ballistic missile prior to launch is more
successful in the overall defense against the threat. [Ref 21] This must be integrated into
and in support of the JFC's overall concept of the operation and campaign objectives.
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C. LITTORAL AAVV
Warfare of primary contemporary interest is littoral warfare. Missiles launched from sea to shore
and shore to sea will create a tactical environment of unparalleled tactical complexity, insofar as
land-sea-air interaction is concerned C.APT Wayne Hughes, USX (Ret.) [Ref 10]
The littoral area contains two parts. First is the seaward area from the open ocean
to the shore, which must be controlled in order to support operations ashore Second is
the landward area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from
the sea Regardless of which of the two parts is being examined, there will be significant
radar and visual clutter which will complicate the surface and air picture for all involved.
Because of the tactical implications associated with controlling the littoral region, the
vicinity of the beach will be a hotly contested region early in a joint operation. Controlled
littorals often offer the best positions from which to begin, sustain and support joint
operations, especially in operational areas with poor infrastructure for supporting
operations ashore. [Ref 1 8]
Active defense must consist of defense-in-depth against all classes of aircraft and
missiles, including ballistic and cruise missiles When destruction of the missile launch
platform prior to launch is not possible or successful, missiles should be engaged by all
means available throughout their entire flight profile Defense-in-depth, while compressed
in the littoral, provides multiple opportunities to negate the missile threat with differing
capabilities, increases the probability of kill, and prohibits the enemy from being able to
easily counter the defensive systems with a single technique Well-rehearsed AAW
defense plans and preparations allow forces in a developed theater to transition swiftly
across the range of military operations [Ref 17]
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Sea-based airpower and sea-launched land combat power are formidable tools that
JFCs can use to gain and maintain initiative at the onset of a littoral campaign Naval
forces operating in littoral areas can dominate coastal areas to mass forces rapidly and
generate high intensity offensive power at times and in locations required by JFCs The
relative freedom of action of naval platforms enables JFCs to position his assets where
they can readily strike opponents The presence of naval forces, if made known, can pose
a threat that the enemy cannot ignore [Ref 18] Even when joint forces are firmly
established ashore, littoral operations provide JFCs with excellent opportunities to achieve
leverage over the enemy by operational maneuver from the sea. An aggressive enemy,
knowing this, may integrate aircraft and missiles against a CVBG that is vulnerable in the
littoral To defend against this, active defense operations must be integrated within the
theater air defense system.
Air, land and sea-launched cruise missiles, to include land attack and antiship
missiles, continue to proliferate and grow in sophistication. Allied nations and deployed
U.S. forces will be vulnerable to missile attack from many developing nations whose
cruise missile stocks may be neither large nor technologically advanced. Missile-equipped
nations may not need to use large numbers of missiles to cause dramatic political change in
a region, because the mere threat or subsequent use of even a few weapons may be
sufficient to achieve a regional goal. Recall the extensive damage inflicted on USS
PRINCETON (CG 59), and the associated media coverage, when it struck a mine -
considered primitive by today's standards - in the Persian Gulf. Obviously, cruise missiles
pose a serious threat to maritime operations in joint littoral warfare.
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D. NAVAL FORCE PROTECTION
Under all circumstances, a decisive naval superiority is to be considered a fundamental principle,
and the basis upon which all hope of success must ultimately depend. General George
Washington [Kef 12]
To aid in the assessment of a CINC staffs ability to successfully employ force
protection of the joint forces' naval component, particularly while stationed in a littoral
region, this thesis provides the methodology which facilitates objective after action
reviews (AARs) at the completion of a CAX; in this case, a JTLS-supported exercise.
Using the data formulation explained in detail in Chapters IV and V, this methodology can
be modified easily to provide force protection AARs for any component force in the
theater; though this thesis is focused on force protection, specifically the AAW capability,
of naval assets in the littoral region
Primarily, the naval component of a joint force is tasked with providing sea-based
air defense and a sea-based means for coordinating control for defense against air attack.
Because of the wealth of unique assets that comprises a naval battlegroup, the naval
component is also capable of providing, upon request, augmentation for air defenses
ashore. Additionally, the naval surface force is responsible for maintaining liaison with
appropriate air defense commanders ashore in order to prevent mutual interference should
air attacks on any part of the joint force occur. In the event of an amphibious landing,
naval assets will provide continuous air defense of their own forces at sea as well as air
defense of the landing force. Throughout the conduct of the amphibious operation, naval
forces, employing organic means and any special air defense augmentation forces which
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may be requested or required for such operations, will ensure that air superiority is gained
and maintained
Despite the near land/overland radar performance anomaly previously discussed in
Chapter I, sensor degradation does not relieve the joint task force's naval component of
the responsibility for force protection, nor should it influence the decisions of the joint
commander with respect to the naval capabilities of his force By applying the
methodology proposed in this thesis to objective post-CAX debriefs, the operational chain
of command - from the CINC and component commanders to their individual staffs - can
quantify strengths and weaknesses of the force protection provided by and for its naval
assets throughout the course of the CAX.
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distinguished by task number. Figure 5 depicts the task relationships between Force


























Figure 5. Joint Tasks Schematic.
strategic joint tasks, while two, three and four digit numbers correspond to supporting,




This chapter presents a methodology for developing quantifiable measures of
effectiveness for assessing air defense functions as described in terms of the appropriate
Universal Joint Tasks Fundamental to the methodology is the assumption that execution
of any given task at a specified level of war is related to the execution of similar tasks at
other levels of war For instance, the UJTL strategic joint task "Provide Theater
Protection" (ST 6) is related to the respective operational and tactical tasks "Provide
Operational Protection" (OP 6) and "Employ Firepower" (TA 3) in the sense that the
employment of firepower may be required operationally to provide Force Protection. In
short, to successfully provide "Force Protection," joint forces must, at a minimum,
demonstrate proficiency on the operational level in "Operational Protection" and, on the
tactical level, in the employment of firepower This establishes the idea of vertical and
horizontal linkages existing among tasks. Vertical linkages not only describe the
relationships between similar tasks across respective levels of war, but also between
joint, supporting, and enabling tasks within a given level of war. Similarly, horizontal
linkages pertain to the dependent relationships between tasks describing a specific
function or component with those tasks describing another. For example, overall force
protection is dependent upon many factors, but most notably how well the functions of
intelligence, arming, fueling, employing firepower, manning, etc are executed. Following
a similar reasoning, the functional area pertaining to the employment of firepower is
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dependent upon the components field services, coordination of arms, ammunition and
equipment and training [Ref 7]
Staff activities, as described by various tasks, become compartmentalized across
components and functions as the size of the staff increases. In analysis, it is necessary to
reflect the dynamics of vertical and horizontal linkage as a matter of aggregation and in
the interest of maintaining the appropriate level of abstraction. After the functional and
dependent relationships between tasks are established, it is possible to determine a causal
audit trail of actions leading to the success or failure of the staffs force protection policy.
Specific steps of the methodology include structuring the schematic of related joint
tasks, developing a primary functional template, relating issues to quantifiable
performance data requirements, determining measures of both performance (MOPs) and
effectiveness (MOEs), and manipulating output data from simulation runs
A. JOINT TASKS SCHEMATIC
The navy under Porter was all it could be during the entire campaign [which]. ..could not have
been made at all without such assistance. The most perfect harmony reigned between the two
arms of the service General U.S. Grant, Memoirs [Ref 12]
Within the UJTL, tasks are broken down in accordance with the three levels of war
(strategic, operational and tactical). The first step in this methodology is the development
of a joint task schematic that depicts the vertical and horizontal linkages discussed above
as they specifically apply to Force Protection. Hierarchical relationships regarding
respective levels of war are illustrated by the relative vertical position at each task level.
Relationships between joint, supporting, enabling, and refined tasks are further
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B. FUNCTIONAL TEMPLATES
Functional templates are tools used to illustrate the precise relationships among
tasks within a single functional area, such as Force Protection. Emphasis is on depicting
the task-to-task linkage between the levels of war from the tactical to the strategic In
addition, components comprising the given functional areas are emphasized The template
is constructed by first considering the basic layout for a functional area as represented in
the task schematic previously described. This highlights the hierarchical relationship
existing between tasks within a given level of war. Next, relationships between related
enabling tasks across different levels of war are determined by analyzing the scope of each
task as defined in the UJTL and their interaction with other tasks Formulation of the
functional template supports the methodology by providing a complete overview of the
span of sub issues (related components) and the levels at which they are resolved for each
functional area. The functional template for the provision of theater protection is shown
in Figure 6 [Ref 7]
C. DATA REQUIREMENTS (DENDRITIC)
The purpose of the dendritic is to refine task requirements to the point where data
explicative of performance can be gathered. The dendritic is formed by focusing on the
overall intent of related joint tasks across levels of war and determining a question whose
data-supported answer will define the intent. This question represents the overall issue
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under investigation and its answer represents a data requirement Similarly, corresponding
functional areas form critical subordinate issues that generally reflect the level at which
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Figure 6. Functional Template of Protection Tasks.
each of the functional areas serve to formulate another level of sub issues that may
determine underlying measures of performance (MOPs) Continued refinement of task
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requirements into more specific and lower levels of aggregation ultimately leads to the
point where data can be gathered with ease from the output files of a CAX. [Ref 7] For
example, a partial dendritic addressing force protection, one critical issue and potential
data requirements is illustrated in Figure 7.
Issue




Hou well is operational aerospace and
missile defense provided 1'
How well are operational forces, non-
combatants, and means protected?
How well is operational security
employed in the theater of operations?
How well is deception conducted in support
of subordinate campaigns and major
operations?
How well is security provided for





How well have air threats
been detected and
identified9


















Critical Issue Sub Issues Data Requirements
Figure 7. Partial Dendritic For Force Protection.
Data requirements are assumed to be unconstrained by physical mechanisms (data
base size, processing times, model resolution, etc.) Furthermore, they may be objective
or subjective Objective data refer to those directly measurable or capturable within the
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context of the computer simulation's output file. Subjective data include non-measurable
or non-quantifiable factors that may stand alone or serve to help qualify observed results
While subjective data from pundits currently define AARs following a CAX, the
methodology contained in this thesis provides a purely objective review based on precise
data retrieved directly from the model
In the specific case when an enemy threat is airborne, the ensuing "detect to
engage" scenario flowchart, as depicted in Figure 8, provides a series of data
requirements as they apply to a functional template on the tactical level By
capturing data at each appropriate juncture of the flow chart, the naval component's
ability to provide anti-air warfare (AAW) can be objectively analyzed upon completion of
the CAX More importantly, the extent to which the measures are applied is nearly
limitless, given the scope of the data supplied by the output from the flow chart. While
the capture of all of the data is not feasible due to prohibitive file sizes, a CINC will
specifically narrow down the focus of the training exercise to enable an analyst to capture
data files of a reasonable size.
D. MOP AND MOE DEVELOPMENT
Each issue in the dendritic and flow chart can be classified as supporting the
development of measures of effectiveness, measures of performance, or data collection
MOPs and MOEs represent an aggregation of supporting data at levels of issues where
meaningful conclusions can be made. They are derived by rolling collected results
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backwards through the dendritic to the point where they can be combined to address





















































































How Mam? How Much
Figure 8. Data Requirements Flow Chart For Detect-To-Engage Sequence.
theater level simulation, but also the reasons for that specific outcome. For example, if the
force is unable to successfully defend against the enemy air threat, was this poor defense
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the result of poor radar performance or an inability to shoot down the threat once detected
and engaged 9 A discussion of potential measures developed through application of the
methodology for evaluating AAW strength follows. Definitions and terms used in the

















hostile acft killed by CVBG AAW assets
hostile missiles killed by CVBG AAW assets
sum of hostile acft flying against CVBG
sum of hostile missiles flying against CVBG
range of intercept for hostile acft engagement
time of detection of hostile acft by CVBG sensors
time of identification of hostile acft by CVBG sensors
binary variable; 1 if acft is detected, if not detected
binary variable; 1 if acft is engaged, if not engaged
surface ship AAW capability factor
overall strength of specific CVBG asset at time, t
hostile acft type (F-1, FISHBED J, Tu-16, P-3C, Mig-27D)
hostile missile type (SS-N-22, SS-N-19, HARPOON, etc.)
friendly ship type (CG, CVN, DD, FFG, etc.)
time
Table 1. MOP Term Definitions.
1. AAW Kill Performance.
Potential measures of performance for several critical issues of battlegroup AAW
performance are described below.
a. AAW performance against aircraft.





In this scenario, no decoy aircraft were used. Effectively all airborne aircraft were
carrying ordnance and were targeting the CVBG This measure is critical to the CVBG's
performance because the failure to negate the enemy air threat directly results in attacks
against the naval forces in the form of both aircraft and missiles.
b. AAW performance against missiles.






Similar to the potential danger of the aircraft threat, an inability to destroy missiles
in flight results in potential damage to the forces in theater
c. Overall CVBG AAW performance.
What percent of the attacking airborne enemy threat is destroyed9
I,ACFT, + Z. MISSILE,
(3)
ZTOTACFT, + TTOTMISSILE,
This measure is simply an aggregation of both aircraft and missile kill performance,
but it serves as an adequate indicator of overall threat kill performance
2. Engagement Range.





This measure is useful for several reasons, but primarily because it provides insight
into the success or failure of the CVBGs defense-in-depth process Defense-in-depth
provides for engagements by long range weapons (CAP aircraft) initially, followed by
medium range weapons (Surface-to-Air Missile (SAMs)), then by short range weapons
(Basic Point Defense Missile System (BPDMS)) and finally the Phalanx close-in-weapon
systems to cover the entire range of the flight profile to a HVU This layered defense
approach provides the maximum number of potential weapons on the threat during the
course of its flight, maximizes the overall kill probability and reduces the likelihood of the
enemy countering all defensive systems with a single weapon system. Ideally, the enemy
aircraft will be destroyed at the minimum of either the identification or effective weapons
range.
3. Threat Identification.
What is the average time required to correctly identify the threat aircraft?
I CLASS (t) - DETS')
(5)
IDETECTION,
Without timely identification performance, a force cannot successfully
engage an enemy threat The rapid detection and classification of enemy air threats is
particularly critical in the littoral, where response times may be measured in seconds.
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4. CVBG AAW Strength.
The product of each unit's strength and the unit's AAW capability factor yields the
battlegroup's cumulative AAW strength as a function of time The AAW strength factors
used for the analysis in this thesis are provided in Appendix A. Note that the CVBG
strength will vary for different missions (AAW, ASW, ASUW, etc.). Though this is not a
stand-alone measure for AAW performance, it can provide the causal audit trail of events
leading to destruction ofCVBG HVUs. For example, should a primary AAW asset be
completely destroyed, the overall AAW capability of the battlegroup will be severely
diminished and the subsequent destruction of additional assets will be more likely. A





The role of a commander and his staff while planning a training exercise is to
formulate the issues that coincide with specific training objectives for the exercise. The
role of the analyst is to develop measures of performance and effectiveness and determine
data requirements to assist in causal analysis of significant events observed during the
simulation. In this case, the causal analysis will provide insight into the specific reasons
why the CVBG was vulnerable during the conduct of the CAX or, similarly, why it was
particularly efficient in its AAW performance The methodology presented proposes
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developing MOEs by aligning task descriptions with inherent issues and refining these to
the point where specific data requirements are established The examples presented above
demonstrate that, given adequate analysis of the issues essential to successful task
accomplishment, development of required measures becomes relatively straightforward
[Ref 7]
Additionally, with the demonstration of the methodology comes a secondary goal
of this thesis Once the method whereby the formulation and extraction ofMOEs and data
is made clear, it is expected that the thesis will inspire critical thinking by readers who will
envision similar applications in other CAXs, in other functional areas, in other missions,
etc. The ability to quantitatively, vice subjectively, evaluate staff and asset performance
at the completion of a CAX is a monumental improvement over the current,
predominantly subjective and statistically bankrupt, system
While this thesis focuses primarily on the kill performance of the CVBG, there are
many more parameters available for the study in the AAW performance of a battlegroup.
Perhaps future analysis in this area would include kill efficiency by examining the number
of missiles fired per kill, or the singular effect of CAP aircraft on AAW performance as
contrasted by the effect of SAMs. These are but a few of the potential MOEs available
from the output of the flowchart given in Figure 8 Other interesting information could
support the efficiency of point defense systems (Phalanx, BPDMS) as modeled in the
simulation. Using this methodology, once a CINC determines a specific area for




In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so
irrevocable as in the military General Douglas MacArthur, 1933 [Ref 1
]
The focus of this chapter is the demonstration ofMOE data extraction from actual
Joint Theater Level Simulation runs. This extraction implies reliance on information and
procedures inherent in the model, as well as the computer code necessary to generate the
required output However, in this case, emphasis is placed on prior determination of the
desired MOPs and keeping the data extraction from the simulation as transparent as
possible to the normal activities of the staff under evaluation. Because it is not desired to
create JTLS-expert staffs, the intent is to adapt the capabilities of the SIMSCRIPT-
supported JTLS to the needs of the staff, rather than to adapt the normal activities of the
staff to the requirements of JTLS. The methodology demonstrated in this thesis is
designed to expedite the implementation and evaluation of staff plans and orders, while
still facilitating the capture and processing of necessary data from the theater level
discrete-time simulation. Once captured, the data are manipulated to produce easily
understandable graphical representations of the measures collected. As such, the
methodology produces a quantifiable review of the performance in areas designated as
training priorities by a CINC.
A. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION
Closely following recent military history, a Southwest Asian theater of operations
was chosen to demonstrate the data extraction methodology However, far from true to
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current events, some liberties were taken to facilitate the initiation of conflict. A carrier
battlegroup, including a nuclear carrier (CVN), two Aegis cruisers (CGs) and other
supporting elements, is steaming in the littoral waters in the vicinity of the Saudi-Kuwaiti
border, as seen in Figure 9. The Iraqis are concentrating on the ground war effort











Figure 9. CVBG Stationing Assignments in the
Threat Sector.
the full force of their air assets to achieving air superiority over Kuwait. Accordingly, the
CVBG is on alert along a threat sector from 315T to 135T, which includes the most likely
avenues of attack from the Iranian air assets at the disposal of the current military leader
The CVBG surface asset and CAP stationing is designed to optimize AAW capability
along the expected threat sector. The surface assets are positioned so as to roughly split
42

the sector responsibility between the two Aegis cruisers and the supporting assets
Known air bases exist on the coast at Bushehr, and inland at Shiraz - each with aircraft
well within their combat radius and capable of inflicting serious damage on the
battlegroup.
Additionally, known missile sites exist on Kharg Island and several Iranian naval
vessels are deployed from Bushehr, armed with anti-ship cruise missiles, that are within
weapons release range (WRR). The CVBG is in the Gulf to provide support, power
projection and air cover for a planned amphibious landing scheduled to take place in the
near future and to assist in gaining and maintaining air superiority during the
accompanying ground war maneuvers. There are three combat air patrol (CAP) stations
active and the carrier air wing is in "Alert Five" - aircraft on the deck of the carrier are
prepared to launch within five minutes - for potential air activity from the enemy. At the
commencement of the exercise, the Iranians are already declared "hostile" in a situation
which allows the engagement of all contacts not classified as "friendly."
Two attack strategies were implemented by the Iranians against the Blue (U.S.)
forces, with different simulations devoted to test the results of each The file outputs and
data manipulation from the different scenario runs illustrate the value of the proposed
methodology The first of the two runs represented a hea\y\ or saturation, raid against the
carrier battlegroup, during which the enemy forces expect to completely saturate the U.S.
naval forces' AAW capability through sheer numbers and the timely coordination of both
air and cruise missile attacks.
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The second scenario, dubbed the light run, represented a reasonable enemy air
threat over time, but was clearly distinguished from the focused and devastatingly
coordinated attack in the heavy run. Figure 10 shows the Southwest Asian Theater of
operations, with all forces from all sides displayed.
1. Heavy Scenario.
To demonstrate the saturation of the CVBG's AAW capability, the underlying















Figure 10. Overview of Southwest Asian Theater Scenario.
cruise missile assets against the battlegroup in a manner necessary to maximize the
damage to the U.S. fleet. While the enemy aircraft represent neither a numerically nor
technologically advanced force, the coordination of air strikes with an intelligently
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conceived and sustained cruise missile attack plan provides a thought-provoking threat
scenario for future tactical discussion. The conflict is initiated by the attack on two of the
three CAP stations by enemy surface vessels who are successful in shooting down the
CAP aircraft. At the same time that the aircraft are engaged, the CVN and CGs are
targeted by cruise missiles from both ship and shore based platforms. The carrier sustains
damage from cruise missiles which hinders her ability to launch and recover aircraft,
thereby thwarting the U.S. effort to maintain fighter aircraft in the medium and long range
AAW arena. Without the "forward eyes" that are normally provided by CAP aircraft, the
Blue forces are blind with the exception of their organic radar sensors, which are degraded
in proximity to land, as previously mentioned.
Figure 1 1 provides a snapshot of the coordinated enemy air assets attacking the












Figure 11. Heavy Run Scenario Action.
CVBG. Repeated waves of aircraft from Bushehr and Shiraz coordinate their missile
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launches so that the arrival of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) is simultaneous with
the arrival of shore based missiles, which are successful in damaging not only the carrier,
but also completely destroying both cruisers Though the simulation ends at this point, it
is safe to assume that the remaining non-AAW assets would soon fall prey to the attacking
missile forces if the scenario were continued.
2. Light Scenario.
To demonstrate a "typical" 1 Persian Gulf scenario, a scenario is developed in which
the Blue forces encounter a variety of random enemy aircraft over time. In this scenario,
the enemy raids are designed to test the reaction and resolve of the U.S. forces more than
to carry out a saturation attack. Over the course of four hours, the enemy engages the
battlegroup with aircraft, air and surface launched cruise missiles, bombs and SCUD
missiles The ability to respond to the threat is largely tied to the quality and timing of the
target intelligence that is available and to the ability of the CAP aircraft to repel incoming
enemy air prior to the release of their weapons. Once again the value of the horizontal
and vertical linkages portrayed by tasks in the UJTL is determined in terms of force
protection tasks.
In this scenario, a premium is placed on the ability of the carrier to launch Deck
Launched Interceptors (DLI, known as Defensive Counter Air, DCA, in joint verbiage)
While the heavy scenario was initiated with the shoot down of the CAP aircraft and the
resulting loss of naval long range AAW, this scenario shows the ability of the CAP to
deter the launch ofASCMs from enemy aircraft while engaged by CAP Upon detection
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of enemy air raids, either CAP or DCA are launched to intercept and engage the raid if
possible, prior to their weapons launch The quantifiable details of the scenario will be
discussed in length in section B, Post Processing, but the effect of "shooting the archer,
not the arrows," meaning killing enemy aircraft prior to the release of their missiles, is
dramatic - as witnessed by the relatively minimal damage sustained by the CVBG in this
scenario relative to the previous saturation scenario
B. POSTPROCESSING
Routines for capturing values required for post exercise analysis were developed
and incorporated into the JTLS code by Rolands and Associates, Inc. The output files
were saved in ASCII format, allowing users to import them into Excel® spreadsheets for
further sorting and analysis.
1. Sorting.
The ultimate goal of the data manipulation was the production of graphs allowing
comparisons of the CVBG AAW performance in each of the two scenarios. Creation of
the graphs required several iterations of data sorting routines of the output files. These
sorting routines predominantly involved the elimination of units which did not contribute
in the AAW defense of the CVBG and the reduction of redundant entries in the data files.
Most importantly, files were sorted by unit to facilitate the removal of non-AAW
platforms and by time to maintain the chronological order of events. In the case of the
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engagement file, an additional sort routine was employed to group engagement types,
which were then sorted chronologically within their respective categories. The sorted
engagement output from the heavy scenario is provided for reference in Appendix C.
2. Time Correlated Strength Measure.
The AAW strength of the CVBG, as previously described, provides a measure of
the battlegroup's AAW capability over time. The initial index value is the sum of all
products of CVBG assets and their AAW strength factor. Figure 12 provides the strength

























Figure 12. Time-Correlated AAW Strength Measure.
measures for both the heavy and light runs and quantitatively shows the stark contrast
between the two outcomes
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In the heavy run, the initial degradation (5:59) is a result of the initiation of
conflict, during which the Iranian surface patrol craft shot down the CAP aircraft While
it is clear that the coordinated raids in the heavy run were designed to impact the CVBG
predominantly between 6:45 and 7:00, the critical damage can be more specifically
analyzed on an individual asset basis. Primarily, in this scenario, each of the three AAW
HVUs (CVN, 2 CGs) were destroyed, resulting in the loss of nearly 80 per cent of the
total AAW capability of the CVBG
The carrier was subjected to only two waves of missile attacks, with the second
wave, occurring at 6:24, providing the final destructive blow With the destruction of the
carrier also comes the removal of her air wing, which was able to fly off prior to the
sinking of the ship. Regardless, the wing was now unable to provide CAP or DCA
aircraft, thereby weakening the overall CVBG strength proportionally.
By 6:46, both cruisers were destroyed, with the first sunk at 6:36. Each was able
to sustain an initial wave of missile and aircraft attacks with moderate damage but could
not defend against subsequent raids after sustaining damage initially. In JTLS, a Weibull
Distribution is used to determine the number of hits needed to sink naval units. [Ref 22]
The data from the light run, also displayed in Figure 12, shows the CVBG strength
when the CAP aircraft are not shot down at the initiation of hostilities and are free to
intercept the inbound raids prior to their weapons release There is no significant damage
to any surface asset in this case, due in large part to the execution of the defense-in-depth
concept Simply stated, it is easier for the surface platforms to engage the "leakers" that
get through the CAP and DCA aircraft than it is to defend against the numerous missiles
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launched by the raids when they are unopposed. In this case, the minute degradation in
AAW strength over the course of four hours is the result of individual aircraft being shot
down in air-to-air combat, thus reducing the squadron strength of the air wing.
Figure 13 provides a graphical representation of the CVBG's ability to execute
defense-in-depth. Regrettably, the engagement data are only available for aircraft at this
writing and not missile engagements; however, future versions of the output code may
include the engagement range data for missiles as well as aircraft. The light
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Figure 13. CVBG Enemy Aircraft Engagement Data For Light Scenario.
scenario is examined first in this case because it provides the most useful data to
demonstrate the methodology Of particular interest is that nearly 80 per cent of all
aircraft engagements occur at 15NM or greater, with 50 per cent at 30NM or greater.
Because 15NM is outside of the weapons range of the basic point defense systems, whose
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maximum effective range is modeled at a generous 10NM, this may be an indication that
the defense-in-depth tactic has achieved some degree of success.
Additionally, approximately 20 per cent of the total engagements were conducted at
long range by CAP. Is 80 per cent of the engagements conducted by sources other than
point defense systems sufficient? That is an issue for the CINC to determine, but now he
may do so quantitatively, based upon the model output. Equally interesting is the fact that
the remaining 20 per cent of engagements are conducted by point defense systems - whose
reliability is often questioned In this case, the point defense system kills 80 per cent (four
of five) of the inbound targets. Figure 14 provides the same data for the heavy scenario,

























Figure 14. CVBG Enemy Aircraft Engagement Data For Saturation Scenario.
though all engagements in this case are SAM engagements due to the initial loss of the
CAP aircraft. The greatest value of this graph is that of determining, due to the
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paucity of aircraft engagements, that a concentration of effort was expended not on
engaging aircraft, but instead on engaging missiles. This serves as an immediate flag to
the breakdown of the defense-in-depth concept because the number of aircraft
engagements, given the magnitude of the total number of incoming aircraft in this
scenario, should be significant. In Figure 14, such is clearly not the case.
Figure 15 displays the identification performance of the CVBG assets against
aircraft in the heavy scenario. This is a measure of the time differential between detection
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Figure 15. CVBG Identification Performance in Saturation Scenario.
and correct classification as an enemy air asset. While over 60 per cent of the
identifications occur in four minutes or less, once again the CINC must determine if that
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measure is sufficient to support air warfare in his theater. Again, though missile data
would be useful in this case, at this writing data are only available for aircraft contacts,
though future plans may include missile data. Should missile data eventually be included
into the identification file, it would be fair to assume that far greater numbers would occur
at the two minute and less mark. Justification for this lies in the fact that in the littoral,
missile flight times of greater than four minutes would be highly unlikely, so the
importance of timely classification becomes an issue of utmost urgency Furthermore,
through the use of Electronic Support Measures (ESM), classification of active seeker
emissions from missiles will be less difficult and far quicker than the classification of third
world aircraft. A sample output from the air detection file is provided in Appendix D.
Figure 16 displays the identification performance ofCVBG assets in the light
scenario. In this case, the performance is nearly consistent with that of the heavy scenario
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Figure 16. CVBG Identification Performance in Light Scenario.
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through the 60th percentile (four minutes), but there is a sharp increase in time required
to improve from the 70th to the 100th percentile. The causal factor for time delay was a
P-3C which was incorrectly classified - twice - and not re-evaluated for several minutes.
Once again, the CINC must determine if this is acceptable performance for operations in
his theater
Finally, a measure of overall kill performance for the two scenarios is presented in























Figure 17. Overall CVBG AAW Kill Performance.
engagement and finally, kill performance may be evaluated. In this case, the stark contrast
between the overall kill performance of the two runs is directly attributable to the effect of
CAP and DCA aircraft in the light scenario. Notice that in the light scenario, over 96 per
cent of all aircraft engaged are killed. In the heavy scenario, the corresponding kill
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performance is only a meager 14 per cent. This stems in part from the fact that the initial
wave of missile and air attacks in the hecny scenario partially degraded the AAW HVUs
capability to wage war. Specifically, recall Figure 12, which shows the damage to the
AAW HVUs in the AAW strength representation The numbers of attackers are compiled
through examination of both the engagement file and the air mission file, which lists all
enemy air attack missions as well as all CAP and DCA missions. A sample air mission file
output for the heavy run is provided in Appendix E. Despite the fact that the performance
of the CVBG against the missile threat was fairly consistent throughout both scenarios,
the impact of the aircraft kill performance dramatically improves the overall AAW kill
performance in the case of the light scenario However, when all enemy air threats are
investigated, the CINC will have difficulty justifying how his best air team's kill
performance is only 66 per cent - that is akin to saying that one of three members will die
in the best case. Why was there less than 100 per cent effectiveness in a scenario during
which no surface ships were damaged by missiles or aircraft, such as the light run9 Simply
stated, in the instances where the CVBG failed to kill the threat, in this case he was
fortunate The area weapons (SCUD) were ineffective and inaccurate, and the cruise
missiles remaining did not reach their target successfully
C. CONCLUSIONS
The use of this methodology to examine CVBG AAW capability appears to
validate the utility of CAP aircraft and shows an inability of surface forces to adequately
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counter a missile threat More importantly, however, this chapter has demonstrated a
methodology by which force protection (in this case the anti-air warfare protection
capability of a carrier battlegroup) can be evaluated in post exercise analysis. In addition,
the methodology illustrates the potential for force AAW improvement through the optimal
use of all CVBG air assets. Viewed exclusively, this analysis does not pinpoint specific
weaknesses in an AAW campaign {why was the missile defense inadequate9 ), though when
viewed as a subset of the overall air picture (including strike, ASW, AEW, recce and other
air missions), it may be possible to improve the performance of the air team.
Additionally, it demonstrates a vehicle for determining a causal audit trail of events
culminating with the loss, in the case of the heavy scenario, of nearly 80 per cent of the
total AAW capability of the battlegroup. In this respect, the performance of the force
regarding joint Strategic Task 6 (Provide Theater Protection) was affected by the
performance of specific tasks involving Operational Task 3 (Provide Operational
Firepower) and Tactical Task 3 (Employ Firepower) In the case of the poor performance
against cruise missiles, data can be collected from similar dendritic and flow charts which
will allow future analysts to focus exclusively on reasons pertinent to missile defense.
Aside from low kill probability, is the performance a results of technological difficulties,
radar anomalies, reaction time deficiencies or perhaps the result of magazine size
inadequacies? Future analysis may answer these questions through the application of this
methodology.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed in war Chinese Proverb
A. CONCLUSIONS
While this research focused on the methodology necessary to evaluate CVBG
AAW capability in a CAX, the principles of the methodology are applicable to the entire
spectrum of UJTL tasks. The methodology is not intended to assess execution ofjoint
tasks Its focus is on evaluating process performance that ultimately is used to provide
insight to significant events observed during the exercise. The methodology is comprised
of two significant elements. The first is the determination ofMOPs and MOEs necessary
for evaluation of the appropriate CINC's exercise training tasks, and ultimately, data
collection The second is the development of the procedures necessary for the data
extraction to simulation output files for manipulation into user-friendly, objective, after-
action review.
There are several strengths of the proposed methodology over the existing post
process evaluations. Primarily, the method is uncomplicated, yet robust enough to be
applicable to a variety of warfare areas, regardless of the particular scenario. Accordingly,
it naturally lends itself to quick analysis that can be easily grasped by all members of the
CINC's staff. Secondly, to produce the data necessary for evaluation does not require
any outside action by the staffs under evaluation, not does it require excess "training cell"
members who may inadvertently confound the smooth running of the game and interfere
with the staffs execution of campaign strategies By automating the order inputs and
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creating precise output file code, the necessary data are immediately and unobtrusively
collected in post processor files for later review upon game completion
Thirdly, by using measures of performance and effectiveness defined prior to the
scenario, an analyst may capture precisely the data necessary to present a completely
objective, statistically sound data set representing the performance of those being
evaluated With moderate effort, that data set may be converted into a graphical
representation of the performance that even non-analysts can easily understand.
Care must also be taken by CINCs to understand the limitations associated with
modeling and simulation. Recall that each simulation represents one possible outcome
based upon randomness introduced through several seeds in the database. In this respect,
the results, either fair or poor, may not actually reflect the capabilities of his staff under
certain circumstances, but instead may simply be a measure of kill probabilities or
logistical readings.
An extremely powerful tool, JTLS is capable of representing virtually all significant
functions relevant to military operations into its inherent procedures and data structures.
Although some functions lack the desired degree of fidelity, the exercise planner should
assume, in the interest of process analysis, that the model is capable of adequately





Continued effort should be directed towards methodology refinement for more
expeditious post-processing analysis. Post-processing requirements for this thesis
involved two aspects The first required the determination of needed information and the
appropriate method to develop the algorithms for capturing and writing result to an output
file The second aspect, primarily data manipulation, involved operations performed on
the output file in preparation for the presentation of results. Considering the scale of the
exercise data base and the force sizes under analysis, the operations required a
considerable amount of time and would not be conducive to large-scale analysis. Better
use of the features inherent in the model's post processor may substantially reduce analysis
time in future analysis, though this requires precise determination of data requirements
during exercise planning and design.
With respect to the evaluation ofjoint AAW in theater level simulations, several
additional topics of interest may be reviewed in future simulations which were not factors
in these simulations. First, the effect of Rules of Engagement (ROE) on warfare may have
a significant impact on both the tactical and operational level in future OOTW and LIC
scenarios. An examination of theater force protection involving challenging ROE, similar
to actual ROE according to CINC-specific doctrine, may provide noteworthy results.
The utility of CAP aircraft on a maritime AAW scenario was demonstrated in these
scenarios, but the specific examination of CVN deck loading in the event of carrier battle
damage and ordinary flex-deck operations may also provide interesting limitations to our
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current capabilities To those who claim that such analysis is inappropriate in a theater
level simulation, recall that a carrier and its air wing are a significant theater asset whose
employment greatly impacts the outcome of battle in the AOR.
Future analysis may gain additional credibility for AAW analysis by incorporating
raid size into the total AAW capability In the case of this thesis, the CVBG performance
was evaluated in terms of a kill measure. A more thorough future evaluation may include
the difficulty, perhaps identifying performance against specific enemy systems, associated
with the overall inbound threat In this thesis the CVBG performed poorly against the
larger raid, but adequately met the threat in the light scenario Perhaps future analysis
may incorporate a scaling factor predicated on the total raid size or the concentration. In
this manner, the scaling factor may be a derivative based on threat per time.
JTLS assumes that all forces operating on the same side have access to electronic
data (data links) from all sensors, regardless of service. While this is ultimately the goal of
the U.S. military forces, it is seldom easy ox possible to gain or maintain a flawless link
with joint forces. That this is not incorporated into the model actually serves to bring the
forces closer to perfect intelligence than they may actually be Perhaps some joint
connectivity difficulties should be incorporated into the model. Similarly, no conflicts
between USN and USAF intercepts are modeled in JTLS - in the model, the closest
available asset responds to enemy air missions, while in an actual theater, politics plays as
large a part in the decision-making process as the tactical implications
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APPENDIX A. AAW STRENGTH FACTORS FOR CVBG ASSETS
The following matrix represents the AAW strength factors used to calculate the
CVBG overall AAW strength index The strength factor is similar to a firepower score
for a specific mission (in this case, AAW) when applied as a product with the individual
asset strength value For this scenario, the aircraft carrier and Aegis cruisers are not only
HVUs, but are clearly the most heavily weighted AAW assets. To examine other mission
















APPENDIX B. STRENGTH FILE POST PROCESSOR OUTPUT
A representative sample of the strength file in both its raw and sorted forms for the
heavy run are provided in this appendix Rolands and Associates, Inc. ensured that the
output, in ASCII format, was formulated to allow the user to quickly and seamlessly
manipulate the data in a commercial spreadsheet. The output provided here, and in all
other appendices, is the result of an Excel spreadsheet manipulation.
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Raw output sample from Strength File:
Game Time Unit Type Unit Strength
3:00:01 1 4SUPPLYCO 694.66
3:00:01 1 4SUPPLYCO 99.76
5:38:24 1 THIRDARMY 99.8
5:45:36 1 3ARMY.ASG 99.78
5:45:36 1 101DISCOM 99.81
5:59:07 1 CVN-71 73.91
6:00:00 1 VF-84 81.74
6:20:54 1 CG-53 83.33
6:24:07 1 CVN-71
6:34:43 1 CG-69 83.33





6:36:05 3 HARP-8 50
6:36:05 1 CG-69









0.2832108 3 HARP-4 3.12
0.2836528 3 HARP-4 6.25
0.2842138 3 HARP-4 9.38
0.287062 3 HARP-4 12.5
0.2902991 3 HARP-4 15.62
0.291669 1 FITRON.IR 98.38
0.291669 1 FARON2.IR 98.38
0.291669 1 D-24DISCO 100
0.2924618 3 HARP-4 18.75
0.2968849 3 HARP-4 21.88
0.2971954 3 TORP5 100
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Sorted output from Strength File:
Game Time Unit Type Unit Strength
5:59:07 1 CVN-71 73.91
6:00:00 1 VF-84 81.74
6:20:54 1 CG-53 83.33
6:24:07 1 CVN-71
6:34:43 1 CG-69 83.33
6:36:05 1 CG-69





APPENDIX C. ENGAGEMENT FILE POST-PROCESSOR OUTPUT
The output from the Engagement File is perhaps the crux of this thesis. Using
these data, it is possible to determine the kill-to-engagement ratio and to evaluate kill
performance against specific threat types. Additionally, further analysis on the efficiency
of kills (for example, number of missiles fired per kill) or other MOEs may be evaluated
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APPENDIX D. AIR MISSION DETECTION FILE OUTPUT
The following represents a sample output of the Air Mission Detection File, which
provides data necessary for the evaluation of detection, identification and classification of
air contacts
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Game Time Detector Side Mission Name Detection Track Number Track Side
5:42:05 UN.FORCES P3C1-280016 BLLR.AIR FIRST_TIME Unknown
5:51:31 UN.FORCES P3C1-280016 BL.LR.AIR BA0006 IRAN
5:54:03 UN.FORCES P3C1-280016 Unknown BA0006 IRAN
5:59:07 UN.FORCES P3C1-280016 BL.LR.AIR BA0006 IRAN
6:06:16 UN.FORCES S27D1-280000 BL.LR.AIR FIRST TIME Unknown
6:07:05 UN.FORCES P3C2-280017 BL.LR.AIR FIRST TIME Unknown
6:10:13 UN.FORCES STU1 61 -280002 BL.LR.AIR FIRST_TIME Unknown
6:10:39 UN.FORCES S27D1 -280000 BL.LR.AIR BA0008 IRAN
6:11:27 UN.FORCES STU161-280002 Unknown BA0010 IRAN
6:12:40 UN.FORCES STU161-280002 Unknown BA0010 IRAN
6:13:53 UN.FORCES STU161-280002 Unknown BA0010 IRAN
6:13:56 UN.FORCES S27D1 -280000 BL.LR.AIR BA0008 IRAN
6:14:18 UN.FORCES P3C1-280016 BL.LR.AIR FIRST TIME Unknown
6:14:57 UN.FORCES BF1 1-280011 BL.LR.AIR FIRSTTIME Unknown
6:15:02 UN.FORCES S27D1-280000 GCI.RADAR BA0008 IRAN
6:15:07 UN.FORCES STU1 61 -280002 Unknown BA0010 IRAN
6:15:50 UN.FORCES S27D1 -280000 GCI.RADAR BA0008 IRAN
6:16:00 UN.FORCES STU1 61 -280002 Unknown BA0010 IRAN
6:16:51 UN.FORCES BF1 1-280011 BL.LR.AIR BA0012 IRAN
6:17:14 UN.FORCES STU161-280002 Unknown BA0010 IRAN
6:18:02 UN.FORCES S27D1 -280000 GCI.RADAR BA0008 IRAN
6:18:27 UN.FORCES STU1 61 -280002 Unknown BA0010 IRAN
6:19:03 UN.FORCES BF1 1-280011 BL.LR.AIR BA0012 IRAN
6:19:17 UN.FORCES BFISH2-280009 BL.LR.AIR FIRST TIME Unknown
6:19:40 UN.FORCES STU1 61 -280002 Unknown BA0010 IRAN
6:19:51 UN.FORCES BF1 1-280011 BL.LR.AIR BA0012 IRAN
6:19:57 UN.FORCES BFISH1 -280008 BL.LR.AIR FIRST TIME Unknown
6:20:14 UN.FORCES S27D1-280000 GCI.RADAR BA0008 IRAN
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APPENDIX E. AIR MISSION FILE
The Air Mission File documents the assignment and status of all air missions that
are executed during the course of the JTLS scenario. The following is a sample output
from the hecny run.
71
Game Time Mission Name Type Acft Type Weapons Load Target
3:30:00 AW1-280018 AWACS E2C NO_LOAD_YET NONE
3:30:00 CAP1-280019 CAP F14 NO_LOAD_YET NONE
3:30:00 CAP2-280020 CAP F14 no_loadIYET NONE
3:30:00 AW1-280018 AWACS E2C E2C.S1 NONE
3:30:00 REF1-280021 REFUEL KC135 NO_LOAD_YET NONE
3:30:00 REF1-280021 REFUEL KC135 KC135.L1 NONE
4:29:59 P3C1-280016 ATTACK P3C P3C.ASM CVN-71
4:54:59 P3C2-280017 ATTACK P3C P3C.ASM CVN-71
5:37:27 CAP1-280019 CAP F14 F14.WL1 NONE
5:37:42 CAP2-280020 CAP F14 F14.WL1 NONE
5:45:00 CAP3-280022 CAP F14 NO_LOAD_YET NONE
5:45:00 CAP3-280022 CAP F14 F14.WL1 NONE
5:53:27 STU1 61 -280002 ATTACK TU16-G TU16.WL1 CG-53
5:55:36 S27D1 -280000 ATTACK MIG27-D MG27.WL1 CVN-71
6:06:11 BFISH1-280008 ATTACK FISHBEDJ M21J.WL4 CVN-71
6:06:28 BF1 1-280011 ATTACK F1 FLAG CG-53
6:08:47 STU1 62-280003 ATTACK TU16-G TU16.WL1 CG-69
6:09:35 S27D2-280001 ATTACK MIG27-D MG27.WL1 CVN-71
6:16:40 STU1 63-280004 ATTACK TU16-G TU16.WL4 CVN-71
6:17:02 BFISH2-280009 ATTACK FISHBEDJ M21J.WL4 FFG-59
6:18:36 BF1 2-28001
2
ATTACK F1 FLAG CG-69
6:19:20 S27D3-280006 ATTACK MIG27-D MG27.WL1 CG-53
6:23:27 STU1 64-280005 ATTACK TU16-G TU16.WL4 CG-53
6:25:36 S27D4-280007 ATTACK MIG27-D MG27.WL1 CVN-71
6:26:06 BF1 3-28001
3
ATTACK F1 FLAG CVN-71
6:26:10 BFISH3-280010 ATTACK FISHBEDJ M21J.WL2 DD-966
6:36:11 BFISH4-280015 ATTACK FISHBEDJ M21J.WL3 CVN-71
6:36:28 BF14-280014 ATTACK F1 FLAG CG-53
72
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